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This paper explores four different water services regimes –liberal, republican, fascist, and democratic – defined by dis-
tinctive historical combinations of politics, environment, tech-
nology, and capital. Building on proposals from urban political
ecology, it argues that water should be seen as constitutive of
the political realm, instead of just considering its management
and infrastructure as a reflex of general political context
(Heynen et al ii, 2006; Swyngedouw, 2004; Matthew, 2004;
Latour, 1999; Latour et alii, 1998; Saraiva, 2008; Barraqué,
1995). By focusing on the case of Lisbon, Portugal’s capital city,
it details how water supply issues materialized, in the urban
space, political regimes that have been the object of traditional
political history. In more general terms, it explores the power of
water to unveil historical conformations typical of modernity.
The Lisbon water history follows well known narratives of
European and North-American cities, namely those relating to
the rise of the networked city in the XIXth century, but it also
presents elements emphasized by scholars dealing with water
infrastructures in the Global South, in particular the presence of
a “concrete divide” between citizens served by first rank infra-
structure and those without access to it (Tarr and Dupuy, 1988;
Graham and Marvin, 2001). As a case in point, while the large
scale Alviela Canal inaugurated in 1880 points at historical
dynamics resonating with Paris, Madrid and New York, the pro-
portion of population reached by this infrastructure, considera-
bly lower than all other European major cities, points to reali-
ties beyond Europe. The relevance of our Lisbon case study thus
relies both on its wide geographical significance and on the
diversity of political regimes – liberal monarchy, republic, fas-
cism, revolutionary democracy, and welfare state – present in
Portuguese modern history.
We named the four different regimes following traditional
historical periodization in order to establish an easy dialogue
with previous scholarship. But our understanding of the politi-
cal realm is defined by elements assembled around concrete
issues that are usually ignored when discussing what constitutes
the public sphere (Latour, 2005). Water supply politics imply
discussions about the nature of private and public enterprise;
the kind of technology used; public health and urban embel-
lishment ; social justice and epidemics; local governance and
central government. We would like to suggest that each water
regime corresponds to a specific arrangement of these different
elements, a non predetermined arrangement that escapes deter-
ministic accounts of urban water supply such as the linear
sequence of pre-modern systems, networked modern city, and
post material values. As we shall see, the cityscape is better
understood as a palimpsest in which new layers of historical
complexity are added to previous historical dynamics without
total erasing of former ones. Our Lisbon story has moments in
which sophisticated modern supply systems live side by side
with improvised wells for self-supply, juxtaposed with environ-
mental concerns with bathing water quality for Sun and Sea
consumers.
PORTUGUESE WATER SERVICES : A SHORT
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
We first offer a short general account of water infrastructure in
Portugal to build up the general framework for the Lisbon case
(1). The history of urban water services in Portugal can be des-
cribed through the enduring confrontation between central
government and municipalities. The creation of the national
Lisbon Water regimes : Politics, Environment,
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Hydraulic Services in the last quarter of the XIXth century (2) set
the scene for contemporary water public policies in Portugal :
most water resources belong to the public domain, the state
bears responsibility for water administration, and its private use
is regulated under two different regimes – license and conces-
sion contracts. Following the roman law tradition, such policy
configuration has ever since given the State discretionary power
to pursue distinct political objectives until today, combining
significant public investment in infrastructure with economic
arrangements involving private stakeholders in areas such as
ports, irrigation systems and dams (3). This policy framework
was also valid for water supply, drainage and treatment systems
in urban areas: while municipalities assumed administrative
and management responsibilities, the central government
would provide financial and technical support through the
Hydraulic Services and its regional branches. The former would
decide whether to run the systems directly, to create adminis-
trative services or public companies, or even to grant conces-
sion contracts to private companies. The latter would supervise
public works developed by municipalities and the development
of water infrastructure. This model was applied in all urban
areas with the exception of the city of Lisbon where central
government intervened directly and decided itself the conces-
sion conditions with a private company.
As is usually the case in long relationships this was not an
easy one. Water indicators, when available, show the results
were far from satisfactory, moreover if we assume its main pur-
pose was first to guarantee universal water supply and drainage
and later wastewater treatment (see figure 1) : in the 1980s only
half the population was served with water supply systems, and
less than a third of Portugal inhabitants had their waste water
treated at the beginning of the 1990s (4). Technical supervision
and financial support were not enough for an effective State
water policy and most solutions tested by municipalities, inclu-
ding the concession of the services to private companies, pro-
ved inefficient (5).
Can we assume the permanence of an institutional conflict
in urban water services between the two levels of government
in Portugal from the end of the XIXth century till the 1980s? It
is probably the case, but it never took the formal character of a
judicial case. Nevertheless, it is clear that municipalities resen-
ted the lack of interest of central government for the wellbeing
of their inhabitants as revealed by the small amount of invest-
ments. On the other hand, central government wasn’t eager to
delegate the responsibility for large infrastructure works to local
authorities, knowing their limited technical capacities and alle-
ged mismanagement of public funds. Anyway, during the long
period of authoritarian government (1926-1974), the popula-
tion could not really express any discontent. The most obvious
conclusion from urban water services data in Portugal through
the twentieth century is their slow development, which lagged
behind other European countries, the recurrent benchmark refe-
rence of Portuguese policy makers.
This old obsession with Portuguese delay was the main
rationale for many initiatives. In 1932, the sanitary problems
caused by water epidemics (cholera surges and others), typical
of a country still lagging in the XIXth century, were a good
opportunity for the dictatorial regime that came out of the 1926
coup d’état, and started the authoritarian conservative rule that
would last until 1974 (6), to prompt a new relation between
central and local power. Local demands to expand water sup-
ply and sewerage infrastructures were a strong political argu-
ment for a closer institutional and technical control by central
government, and the creation of the Water Sanitary Council
(1933) was thought to be enough to accomplish such purpose.
Figure 1. Total population served with water services (%)
Year Water Supply Waste WaterCollection
Waste Water
Treatment
1941 24.60 - -
1970 37 14 -
1977 40 16 -
1982 50.21 - -
1990 79.60 61.80 -
1998 85 64 42
2000 90 75 55
2006 91 77 70
2009 97 81 71
2011 97 81 78
Sources : MOPC, 1941 ; Presidência do Conselho, 1973 ; GPC, 1977 ;
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The Ministry of Public Works, probably the most active
branch of government in materializing the visions of the autho-
ritarian New State, adopted an even tighter position by creating
the Bureau of Urban Services (Direcção Geral dos Serviços
Urbanos – 1944). The Bureau surveyed the needs in urban
water infrastructure, designed the projects and forced munici-
palities to implement them. The State financed 50% of the buil-
ding costs of water supply and sewer networks, and 75% in the
case of distribution through public fountains for small villages
(MOP, 1954). Indeed, the dictator Oliveira Salazar, in his typi-
cal vindication of traditionalist values, feared that the good old
Portuguese habits would fade away if women didn’t gather
around water fountains any more (Freitas do Amaral, 1995).
And it is important to remind that by 1940 only 20% of the
population, out of a total of 8 million people, was living in
urban areas. A substantial increase in municipal funding occur-
red, as well as technical orientation and support, but the evolu-
tion, as already stated, was just too slow. While the number of
interventions subsidized by the central government steadily
increased in the 1940s and 1950s (from 200 in 1946 to 800 in
1960), the number of interventions concluded by the munici-
palities remained at a much lower level (from less than 10 in
1946 to around 70 in 1960) (7). By the end of the 1960s, the
government itself recognized that the policy framework was not
adequate to cover urban areas with necessary infrastructures,
but no substantive change took place before the end of dicta-
torship.
The April Revolution in 1974 and the two-year period that
followed, dominated by radical left-wing politics, were times of
sudden and substantial political change in Portugal. This was
not solely the result of the assertion of new social and political
values, but was also due to the high expectations associated
with the creation of an effective welfare state that would finally
reach the entire population (8). Water policies were no excep-
tion, and a new model for water services was designed, dividing
the country in sanitation regions, geographically corresponding
to districts. Public companies, under the control of the central
government, should be established in each region promoting
scale economies and technical cooperation (9).
Such drastic cut on the influence of municipalities was
clearly against the political spirit of a revolution that promised
to promote democratic institutions at local level. And this is pro-
bably the most significant cause for the failure of the regional
model. Some of the companies were eventually created in the
following years but they never began to operate. Nevertheless,
the growing responsibilities of municipalities in the new regime
were no solution either for better water supply or the universa-
lity of sewer systems. In the 1980s local power was facing the
double challenge of building at the same time the basic infra-
structure of water supply (as already noted, only 50% of the
population was covered by then) and of wastewater treatment
in tune with the new environmental paradigm emerging since
the 1970s (10).
Social policies were finally becoming generalized – health-
care, education, housing… – and even though sanitation was
part of the political agenda, investments and the development
of practical solutions in the sector were implemented very slow-
ly: the State didn’t seem to have enough resources to fulfill all
social demands.
Only an exogenous stimulus, such as the entry in the
European Community in 1986, was able to dramatically chan-
ge the Portuguese water policy model. The abundance of struc-
tural funds for environmental intervention, as well as the consi-
deration that innovative environmental policies were necessary
for this purpose, implied a deep change on the water institutio-
nal framework and on the water services model. The first step
was undoubtedly taken in 1987 with the extinction of the
Hydraulic Services, ending 103 years of explicit hydraulic cen-
tralization tradition, and the subsequent creation in 1993 of the
Instituto da Água (Water Institute) aimed at consolidating the
new environmental paradigm in water policies.
Since the beginning of the 1990s the degradation of water
quality, as well as its implications on water use (for consump-
tion or leisure), became a major public issue. Institutional
changes and the media were crucial for the acknowledgement
of the multiple dimensions of water problems: pollution of
rivers and beaches associated with the lack of wastewater treat-
ment facilities ; groundwater pollution and overexploitation;
inefficient water supply and bad water quality… For the first
time, in 1993, an official report on the water quality status was
openly discussed, informing public opinion about the bad
condition of most water bodies, as well as about the low quali-
ty of water served to urban populations.
In the mid 1990s new laws regulating water services defi-
ned new terms for the relationship between municipalities and
the central government. The major innovations introduced by
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level (wholesale/production) and lower level (retail/distribution)
systems, as well as the creation of both a state-owned national
water company (Águas de Portugal) (11) and a regulatory agen-
cy (12). Central government wanted to consolidate municipal
services through this public holding, which proposed several
neighboring municipalities to create, manage and finance a
single water company that would jointly produce drinking
water as well as treat waste water (água alta, upper systems).
The majority of these companies’ stock would be State-owned
with municipalities always in a minority position. The latter
would, in turn, be encouraged to keep and develop the mana-
gement of potable water distribution and of waste water collec-
tion (água baixa, lower systems) ; municipalities could either
grant the concession of these services to public or private com-
panies, create municipal services or even municipally-owned
companies. European funds would be channeled to water sys-
tems through Águas de Portugal.
The creation of the public holding was an incentive for scale
economies and technical integration. The reform was justified
with the need of achieving higher efficiency, as well as mana-
gerial and technical competencies in water services in both
upper and lower level systems (13). Nevertheless, even nowa-
days, most water services run by municipalities still don’t have
sufficient know-how. The regulatory agency reveals in its annual
reports (14) that the inexistence in some municipal services of
regular business accountancy, essential to produce a water ser-
vice cost structure, has been a significant cause for the present
undervalued price of water at municipal level. Most municipa-
lities do not charge the real cost of water services, disregarding
the principles recommended in the European Water Framework
Directive, as can be seen with the variation of water prices per
m3 among all municipalities : the latest regulatory agency report
claims the price range is 1 to 20 (RASARP 2014 report).
The model defined in the 1990s produced significant
changes and channeled major investments into the water sector.
In 2004, there were 19 concessions controlled by the central
government (Águas de Portugal, SGPS) together with municipa-
lities on the upper level systems, as well as 23 concessions (pri-
vate and public) on the lower systems (15). On the lower level
there were 266 services directly run by the municipalities (16).
This scenario has not changed significantly, accordingly to the
RASARP 2012 report (16 concessions on the upper level ; 267
municipal services at the lower level). Although this still repre-
sents the larger share of the water services market, no financial
information is available from the regulatory agency about lower
level services. Thus, not only do municipalities lack accounting
and technical know-how, but they also escape any accountabi-
lity to the regulatory agency. Yet, most water services in Portugal
are not as small and scattered as in other countries like France
and Italy, due to the large size of Portuguese communes. But
there clearly seems to be lacking a multilevel policy specifical-
ly dedicated to small units. In addition, most of the investments
have been channeled to water supply: wastewater collection
and treatment still have significant deficiencies in quantity and
quality terms (17).
The water price can also be considered to be a sign that the
reform is still far from completion. Upper level systems display
a strong dispersion of water prices, with a price differential in
the proportion of 1 to 2.5 (18). Moreover, the maximum price
paid by Portuguese consumers for water supply is less than half
the mean price paid by their European counterparts, despite the
fact that these prices have been increasing over the years, most-
ly from 2011 to 2014 (RASARP 2014 report). These indicators
reveal that either the prices do not reflect real costs, or the
necessary investments are not being done. And it is well known
that it is politically risky to increase water prices too fast (19).
Despite considerable evolution, there is a long way to go.
Water supply and treatment systems have been prioritized over
the last thirty years, taking over two thirds of the total funding
for the environmental sector investment from the first and
second European Community Support Frameworks (CSF) (1986-
1992; 1993-1999). The irony of the situation is that both the
third CSF (2000-2006) and the National Strategic Reference
Framework (2007-2013) still defined the water sector as an
investment priority. In fact, the problem doesn’t seem to be
exclusively financial : in spite of all the EU funds, the lack of
local technical know-how and of an inspection structure meant
that much of the money was simply thrown away. A devastating
report published in 1995 by the National Laboratory of Civil
Engineering revealed not only the lack of skills to properly ope-
rate the new sewage treatment plants but also the obsolete tech-
nological solutions adopted (Baptista and Matos, 1995). Almost
twenty years later, the regulatory agency’s report claims that
almost 55% of waste water treatment plants still operate without
adequate capacity (RASARP 2012 report).
The impact of European funds on the water sector, as well
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in considerable quantitative improvements, but financial and
technical problems, as well as infrastructural ones, remained.
An inquiry conducted in 2004 revealed that 70% of Portuguese
mayors still identified water and sanitation as their most urgent
environmental problem (52% referred to sewerage and 18% to
water supply), and 33% elected sanitation as the most impor-
tant problem affecting municipalities, over social or economical
problems (Schmidt et alii, 2005). This clearly indicates water as
a recurrent issue, that cumulates first, second and third genera-
tion environmental problems. While Portugal has transferred
already in 2005 into national law the European Water
Framework and its demands for considering quality of all water
ecosystems sustainably managed at the scale of catchment
basin scale, it is still building basic sewage infrastructure as well
as wastewater treatment plants.
To sum up, though a new policy framework is gradually
superseding, its results are still far from proving this is the most
adequate solution. The relationship between central govern-
ment and municipalities is increasingly centralized, and the ten-
dency for the creation of large regions of water services is clear
with the recent technical integration of systems and political
decisions. In fact, such a framework converts what was an
exception at the upper level – the case of Lisbon and the State
owned Lisbon water company EPAL – into the general pattern
of water services policy all over the country, emphasizing the
regional scale and the direct role of the State, as well as the
significant improvement of technical and management know-
how. Thus the creation of several “EPALs” (at least on the upper
level system) through the territory was considered the best solu-
tion to properly manage the boom in water infrastructure that
came out of the European funds. This recent evolution makes it
all the more relevant to consider in more detail the history of
water supply in Lisbon. This metropolitan area now has some
2.5 million inhabitants, the only real metropolis of the country
where the urban dimension of water becomes a more relevant
issue. And what could just be seen as a legitimate methodolo-
gical option of describing the best documented case, a typical
‘case study’ methodology, becomes an inquiry into the main
laboratory of water policies for the entire country.
Now since 2000, the privatization option of water services
has become a clear issue in the press, mainly through the voice
of well-known opinion makers that alerted about the risks that
could emerge from such an option. Public announcements from
the successive Ministers of the Environment from 2000 to 2006,
suggesting the possibility of privatization of water services,
become a significant political fact open to speculation. Even
though the Socialist Government elected in 2005 (and which
ruled the country until 2011) excluded the privatization scena-
rio, the topic re-emerged in 2011 with the current economic
crisis and the agenda imposed by the troika formed by the
IMF/EU/ECB (International Monetary Fund/European
Union/European Central Bank).
As we shall see, much of this national narrative resonates
with what went on in Lisbon. But the relationship is not one of
applying to city scale what we learned from the national one.
Lisbon water may be better perceived instead as defining the
terms with which water was discussed at national level. The
capital city was the stage in which historical actors experimen-
ted with different arrangements of politics, economy, technolo-
gy, and environment through water.
LISBON CASE – LIBERAL WATERS (1851- 1910)
The monumental character of the Águas Livres (Free Waters)
aqueduct built in the XVIIIth century may suggest that the issue
of water supply to Lisbon had been solved in advance of other
European cities (20). And indeed, the imposing infrastructure
inaugurated in 1748, transporting water from sources some 18
km northwest of the city, would resist the catastrophic earth-
quake of 1755 and crucially change the city fabric. Together
with the new royal palace and the cathedral (Patriarcal), the
aqueduct confirmed Lisbon status among major European
cities, the site of an absolutist court fed by torrents of Brazilian
gold. Besides serving palaces and convents, its waters were
mainly directed to a network of public fountains that contribu-
ted to redefine baroque Lisbon and the relation of the absolutist
monarch with his subjects. Following the Roman example, each
new fountain was embellished with sculptures of classic mytho-
logical figures and placed in newly enlarged squares as urban
landmarks. Some were only built in the XIXth century, while
others were never completed following the original grandiose
plan, but fountains such as Janelas Verdes, Esperança, Sao
Paulo, Loreto, Santana, were all designed with baroque scenic
effects in mind. The new fountains supplied mostly the city’s
western half, the privileged area for urban renewal, while the
older eastern neighborhoods of medieval origin continued to
rely mainly on intramural sources. By 1850, a municipal survey
revealed that Lisbon dwellers were getting their water from 42




























































ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Instituto de Ci?ncias Sociais-UL -   - 194.117.18.21 - 16/03/2015 19h50. © M
étropolis 
Saraiva, Schmidt, Pato - Lisbon Water regimes (1850-2010)
Dossier 65
streets and at their door house from some 3,000 water carriers
of Galician origin who filled their barrels in public fountains at
no cost (Andrade, 1851).
The water carriers would become a characteristic Lisbon
social type, denounced for their foreign origin and for being
constantly involved in street fighting and robbery. No less than
200 of them filled their barrels in the centrally located Loreto
fountain under a magnificent Neptune sculpture, which earned
the place the depreciative epithet of “Galician Island”.
Interestingly enough, this was also the area of cafes, opera, and
clubs, the heart of Lisbon liberal sociability of mid-XIXth centu-
ry. The demolition in 1855 of the fountain and the transfer of
Neptune to a faraway location are the best indicator that some-
thing was changing in Lisbon water culture. The previously
major accomplishment of the monarchy was now denounced
as urban nuisance, source of social misbehavior to be dealt with
it by the police. The water that linked the monarch and its sub-
jects, and that materialized Ancien Regime relations, had to be
transformed into a commodity embodying the new liberal order
that arrived with the seizure of power by engineers in the 1851
coup d’état.
This “regenerationist” coup, which clearly paralleled the
example of Napoleon III in France, promised to put an end to
previous political and social disputes by an ambitious program
of “material improvements” led by engineers : “a coup to end all
coups” (Cabral, 1976). Immersed in French Saint-Simonian uto-
pias of crossing the globe with technologies that would bring
global peace and prosperity, Portuguese engineers would
famously plan a road and railway network linking the country
to the rest of Europe. At the city scale, the saint simonian prin-
ciple of equating circulation with social progress would be
translated in the following decades in the multiplication of tech-
MAP 1. LISBOA NETWORK 1856-1900
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nological networks enhancing the circulation of people, goods,
information, light, air, and, of course, water. Avenues, embank-
ments, gaslights, telegraph cables, tramways, sewage pipes and
water supply canals would radically transform the city. Quoting
directly developments in other European cities, namely Paris,
and importing when necessary expertise and technology,
Lisbon would also become a networked city (Saraiva, 2005;
Silva, 2001; Lisboa, 2002).
The baroque aqueduct and its elaborate fountains were
apparently not able to sustain such visions, becoming instead
the embodiment of the old order. Foreign engineers visiting the
city denounced the uselessness of the impressive masonry of the
aqueduct, “a landmark of ignominy to the Portuguese people”,
which delivered “no more than 4 liters per head” in the 1850s
(Valle, 1856). After failed attempts to interconnect different net-
works, with proposals to build at the same time gas and water
supply, epidemics would constitute the main vehicle through
which a new water regime would take hold in the city (21). The
cholera and yellow fever epidemics of the years 1856 and
1857, with a death toll of some 9.000 Lisbon inhabitants out of
a total population of 160.000, were the direct cause for central
government involvement in Lisbon waters through the recently
created flamboyant Ministry of Public Works, the institutional
tool of engineers to regenerate country and city (22).
As it had previously made with railway concessions, in
1858 the State signed a concession contract with Empresa de
Águas de Lisboa (EAL), the first Lisbon water company formed
with the capital of 64 Portuguese shareholders that promised to
deliver 93.75 liters per day for every Lisbon inhabitant. The
company hired the French engineer Louis-Charles Mary (1791-
1870), ponts et chaussées inspector of the Seine département,
who designed a project of several lateral aqueducts to be
connected to the XVIIIth century one. But more important for
our argument than the addition of these new water sources to
save the utility of the old aqueduct was Mary’s design of a dis-
tribution network, which relied on four new reservoirs for
conducting water to the different neighborhoods and to every
Lisbon building. This network was a significant innovation when
compared to all the previous projects that continued to insist on
just increasing the volume of waters delivered by public foun-
tains and on the presence of Galician carriers to reach indivi-
dual dwellings. For the first time, the city as a whole was put
under the engineer’s rationality, willing to transform it into an
efficient organism. The Haussmanization of Lisbon had started.
Pushing to make every Lisbon inhabitant its client, EAL
transformed water into a commodity. In the following years the
municipality would become its first opponent. Its will to reco-
ver control of water supply issues was based on the unfortuna-
te experience with the gas company, and its members repea-
tedly denounced the dangers of a private monopoly threatening
the public interest. Despite all criticisms, the granting of conces-
sions was the typical solution adopted to expand infrastructure
over the national territory by the “regenerationist” government:
it brought together technology and credit as Portuguese engi-
neers had learned from their French Saint simonian counter-
parts. The municipality actually turned out to be right : this first
water company was never able to deliver the promised amounts
of water and never demonstrated enough financial capacity to
build the lacking infrastructure.
In 1863, under the pressure of the municipality’s disappro-
val and the protests by the population during a drier than usual
summer, the government formed an inquiry commission which
found out that the company only supplied 8% of the agreed
water (23). But this didn’t result in local power recovering
control over Lisbon waters ; instead, the Ministry of Public
Works took direct responsibility in the name of the capital’s
hygiene. The municipality argued that water supply and sewe-
rage (which already was a local responsibility) were joint ser-
vices, thus claiming the control of both. But central government
sustained that the new infrastructure designed by the engineers
of the Ministry was just too expensive and complex to be mana-
ged at local level. Searching for new sources that would be
abundant enough, State engineers had indeed presented a pro-
ject for a new aqueduct bringing water from more than 100 km
away from Lisbon. This long Alviela Canal put an end to the
municipality’s demands, and in 1867 the State signed a new
contract with a private company, the Companhia das Águas de
Lisboa (CAL), which hired the engineers of the Ministry of
Public Works to lead its technical section and was controlled by
the very shareholders of the first company. Private capital inves-
ting in an infrastructure imposed by State regulations and desi-
gned by State engineers who were hired by that same capital.
Water was in fact a central element in connecting the expansion
of the liberal State with the creation of new opportunities for
capital investments.
The building of the canal suffered long delays as it is usual-
ly the case with ambitious public works. To expropriate the
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But it proved even more difficult to reach an agreement bet-
ween the Company, the State, the Municipality and Lisbon pro-
prietors about the canal’s regulation. The company insisted that
every proprietor should be forced to connect to the company’s
distribution network (Alves, 1940; Pinto, 1989). Only after the
approval of this regulation did the company guarantee its finan-
cial viability to cover the infrastructure building expenses. In
1880, the Alviela canal was finally inaugurated. The regulation
aimed at transforming each city dweller into a client of the
water company, paying his water according to the company’s
meter, drastically changed Lisbon’s water regime. While the
XVIIIth century aqueduct materialized the relation between an
absolutist king and his subjects contributing to the magnificen-
ce of the capital of the kingdom and the well being of its popu-
lation, the new Alviela Canal was to make every Lisbon inhabi-
tant into a water consumer sustaining a private company put in
place by State engineers. The petty business of suspicious
Galician water carriers was to disappear to give place to a dis-
tribution infrastructure and the alleged transparent world of
capitalist relations. Instead of cries of “fresh water”, Lisbon
dwellers listened now to the repetitive noise of water meters
clockwork mechanism, counting the number of times two alter-
nate oscillating vessels were filled up. From 1867 onwards,
“Bastos counters”, named after the mechanic Pinto Bastos who
as head of the CAL’s workshop patented prize-winning meters in
the Vienna World Exhibition of 1873, were installed in Lisbon
houses charging water by volume of consumption and materia-
lizing the transformation of Lisbon householders into clients of
the water company (24). Liberal waters had replaced baroque
waters.
The arrival of the Alviela waters in 1880 was celebrated in
a mass event staged to mark the new age of Lisbon sanitation.
The new canal, although much longer than the baroque aque-
duct, lacked the monumental character of the latter. Suitably
enough, instead of the static infrastructure, the gigantic steam
engines that pumped the waters into the reservoirs supplying
the entire city took the whole stage. These were the new monu-
ments of the liberal age, celebrated in Lisbon’s press by reciting
the technical details of the machines the power of which made
water reach every building of the city, independently of being
located in low or high neighborhoods. Together with the rail-
way lines connecting the capital to every district head city and
the rest of Europe, the works of the big port and the new large
avenues that haussmannized Lisbon, the water works were pre-
sented as the proof of the ability of the liberal State to put
Portugal on the path of Progress. Lisbon was hailed as the capi-
tal of a modern country, with engineers designing the networks
that controlled the flows of people, goods and water (25). The
new daily 30.000 m3 brought in by the Alviela canal were taken
by the press as a kind of magic solution that converted Lisbon
from a dry North African city into a green European Capital
freed from the epidemics so much feared by urbanites.
Now, to eradicate epidemics, the first argument for the buil-
ding of the new canal, it is not enough to have abundant
potable water. Sewerage plays an equally, if not more, funda-
mental role. As already noted, the claim by local authorities to
take control of water supply was justified by a hygienist rheto-
ric tightly connecting distribution and sewerage. State Engineers
had first envisaged in 1874 a waste carriage system using water
as draining and cleansing agent of sewage pipes admitting
human feces (like in London and Paris) ; conversely, the muni-
cipality favored a system of cesspools and privy vaults for solid
wastes, with sewage pipes being used exclusively to collect rain
runoff and water used in sinks. It was quite a paradox that a typi-
cal argument for municipalisation of water supply all over
Europe – the need of copious water quantities for the proper
work of the water-carried sewer system – was thus absent from
the Lisbon debate on the control of urban waters. The munici-
pality could not claim for more water when it favored cesspools
and vaults. When in 1880, the Alviela waters arrived, a muni-
cipal commission involving State engineers started to design a
sewer system relying on the water-carriage model that would be
approved four years later (Silva, 2006).
This new sewer network would grow at a very slow pace
unveiling the limitations of the liberal regime and the Alviela
infrastructure. It was impossible to universalize sewage collec-
tion when water supply was covering only about 50% of the
city’s households in 1890 and some 60% ten years later. In spite
of all the rhetoric about Lisbon dwellers as consumers, a large
part of the population was thus still getting its water from public
fountains.
Also, in sanitary terms, there was nothing more dangerous
than building an extended network of sewers without enough
water to clean them, for they could become the main epide-
mics’ locus; it was argued that it had been the case in the pre-
vious cholera outbreak. The main consumers of the Company’s
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accounting for 76% of the total consumption for the years
1900-1909. This was the nature of the Portuguese liberal State.
Thus it is no surprise that the main concern of the Company was
to push for the government and the municipality to pay their
growing water debts, a dispute that had to be solved by the
Administrative Court. Water in Lisbon was thus facing a double
bottleneck: the sewer system could not grow because of the
insufficient water supply coverage of private households; priva-
te consumption didn’t grow enough to sustain the company and
cover the costs of enlarging its supply infrastructure because the
sewage system (one of the main water consumers) was not com-
pleted. That was the price to pay for separating water and waste
water.
REPUBLICAN WATERS (1910-1926)
At the turn of the century, it was obvious that water infrastruc-
ture development was not keeping pace with the city’s popula-
tion growth. In 1900, Lisbon already had some 350.000 inha-
bitants, a huge upsurge when compared to the 200.000 people
living in the city in 1864. In the 1920s, the numbers would
climb till almost 600.000 (Figure 2). In the first decade of the
XXth century, the water company was already facing a problem
of scarcity of available water. For the years 1900-1909, the total
daily consumption per capita was down to 74.1 l, with private
consumption limited to 17.7 l. In 1905, only 25 years after the
grand-opening of the Alviela Canal, the Company started to
look for other sources, namely for surface water of the Tagus
River (Pinto, 1989; Silva, 2006; Alves, 1940).
Although the new project to bring water from the Tagus was
praised as the most complete and detailed engineering project
ever produced by Portuguese technicians, the Company was
never able to launch it in those early decades of the XXth cen-
tury when Lisbon population was exploding. The expensive 80
km of the Tagus Canal designed to bring 108.000 m3 water daily
to Lisbon were constantly postponed among complaints of the
debts of the government and municipality towards the
Company or the low water price paid by private consumers. The
resistance against a Company that saw its share price increase
fourfold from 1870 to 1909 was reason enough for its bad press
among the Lisbon population. The case got even worse in 1913,
when it became clear that during the dry season the Alviela
canal did not suffice to meet the growing demand. In July, the
residents of the more elevated areas of the city, where the sup-
ply was interrupted for several days, even broke the fire hydrants
BOYS AND GIRLS AND WOMEN IN LISBON’S
FOUNTAIN, 1907
Chafariz do Rato (1907) – Photo credit : Arquivo Municipal
de Lisboa, Joshua Benoliel, JBN001226.
Aguadeiros no chafariz do Rato (1907) - Photo credit :
Arquivo Municipal de Lisboa, Joshua Benoliel, JBN000091.
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(26). The fighting of fires inside the urban perimeter became a
critical issue, with the press denouncing how small fires rea-
ched catastrophic dimensions by lack of available water (27).
The constant water shortages during the summers led the
Company, in accordance with central government and suppor-
ted by the National Guard, to set a plan for water rationing, dis-
tributing it through 60 improvised public fountains and by water
tankers circulating through the city streets (Pinto, 1989). After
having converted the majority of the Lisbon population into its
clients, the Company with police support now controlled public
access to water. The newspapers, exhorted by the municipality’s
complaints, excited public opinion against a Company whose
headquarters suffered a bombing assault in 1924 (Pinto, 1989).
That same year water rationing was discussed in Parliament with
members of the government themselves denouncing the ratio-
ning measures taken up by the Water Company. The turbulent
years of the Republican regime that came to power in 1910,
overthrowing the monarchy, were characterized by the emer-
gence of urban masses as political actors repeatedly occupying
the public space of the capital city. Protests and bombs were
part of the political repertoire and it is no surprise that they also
impacted the relations between Lisbon dwellers and the water
company.
But during the first decades of the century, the scarcity of
water supply was not the only reason for the public distrust
towards the Company. The typhus outbreaks of 1907 and 1912
transformed water quality into a subject of public concern (28).
While in 1907 it was found out that cesspools and old sewer
pipes had contaminated the supply pipes of the Company, in
1912 one of the Company’s reservoirs was identified as the
source of the epidemics affecting 2615 people and killing 254.
Engineers were not the only experts to have a say in the city’s
water supply, having now to make space for bacteriologists. If
the steam engines pumping Alviela waters embodied the liberal
water regime, the scientific ritual of analyzing the company’s
waters reproduced in the illustrated press announced the
Republican water regime. The contrast of old and new was in
fact magnified by the fact that the contaminated waters came
from a reservoir connected to the old baroque aqueduct. The
photographs of modern laboratory men visiting the old infra-
structure in the Lisbon outskirts and carefully taking samples
from water fountains emphasized the authority of the new
experts. Portuguese historians are well aware of the central role
of physicians in a Republican Regime that promised to counter
the degeneration of the National body through a new political
order. Republican waters also incorporated laboratory medicine
FIGURE 2. EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION IN LISBON
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and its microbes as crucial elements for the care of Lisbon
urban dwellers’ bodies.
Only after 1918 was water chlorinated. The consumers the-
reafter repeatedly denounced its bad taste, which led to inter-
rupting the water treatment in 1926, with chlorination returning
only in 1931 (Pinho, 1942). By then the number of deaths cau-
sed by typhoid fever had receded to 13 cases per 100.000 inha-
bitants (29), but such figures were still 10 times bigger than the
ones for Berlin or London. The main reason for such a gap was
the need of Lisbon population to make up for the Company’s
rationing measures during the dry season, through the use of the
non reliable private water sources and wells still existing in the
city area and its suburbs (Pinho, 1945). It is not only that a new
biomedical dimension had been added to the engineers’ infra-
structure, increasing the complexity of Lisbon water supply. The
new technoscientific layers didn’t eliminate older ones, in
which city dwellers took themselves the initiative of finding
their own water. In 1945, an inventory by government engineers
counted no less than 2,512 private wells inside the city perime-
ter, with only 10 belonging to the Municipality. The palimpsest
was indeed impressive: wells, baroque aqueduct, fountains,
steam engines and laboratories. Layer built upon layer without
eliminating previous historical realities.
AUTHORITARIAN WATERS (1926-1974)
The tensions around water supply in Lisbon were of course
unbearable to the dictatorial regime that came out of the mili-
tary coup of 1926. The constant quarrels between the
Company, the municipality, the central government and the
population, were taken as paradigmatic of the powerlessness of
the Republican regime (1910-1926) to solve social disputes and
properly manage public affairs (Alves, 1947). In 1932, the very
same year he was nominated Minister of Public Works of the
first cabinet formed by Oliveira Salazar, Duarte Pacheco (30)
launched the new basis for Lisbon water supply. The solution
couldn’t be simpler : the water price was abruptly increased by
some 40% with the Company obliged to immediately start the
construction of the Tagus Canal, planned back in 1908. The
Company was now also responsible for water quality, having to
install chlorination plants at its own expense. In case the
Company wouldn’t accept the conditions set by the
Government, the State threatened to directly take over Lisbon
water supply and the company would be dismantled. Even
though the solution was presented without any kind of negotia-
tion, with the company learning the terms of the agreement by
the morning newspapers, the new contract was quickly signed
(Alves, 1940).
Once again, the main loser was the municipality : despite its
ambitions of taking over a company that didn’t fulfill its duties
for so long, it never had enough political power or financial
capacities to take care of the city water supply (31). The only
TECHNICIAN FROM THE CAMARA PESTANA
BACTERIOLOGICAL INSTITUTE
COLLECTING WATER FROM THE
PORCALHOTA FOUNTAIN, 1912
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dialogue was between the Company and the central govern-
ment, with the creation within the Ministry of Public Works of
a Commission for the Inspection of Lisbon Waters (CFAL).
Beyond controlling the company’s activities and inspecting
every new work, this government agency could also present
new projects to be undertaken by the company. The solution of
keeping a private monopoly together with a strong interference
capacity by the State was the typical way Salazar’s “corporatist
New State” would intervene in the economy, which in the fol-
lowing years would also be applied to hydroelectricity produc-
tion or steel manufacture. If the first water concession of the
XIXth century was paradigmatic of the way liberal governments
extended infrastructure over the territory, Lisbon waters under
the dictatorship set the tone for the many years to come of the
authoritarian State. The best proof of such a claim is the ironic
comment made by the head of CFAL that the people of the capi-
tal didn’t protest against the over 40% increase in price impo-
sed by government (Alves, 1947). Public conflicts had now
been officially banished for a long time, urban water conflicts
included, as further confirmed by the media analysis (32).
In 1933-34, under the pressure of CFAL, the company had
already doubled its supply capacity. In the following years,
CFAL engineers replaced the project to supply Lisbon with sur-
face water by the much cheaper solution of extracting ground-
water from the Tagus alluviums in an area closer to Lisbon,
shortening by some 20 km the new huge Tagus canal with a
daily capacity of 257.500 m3. In 1940, CFAL could already be
proud of the daily 137.000 m3 summer supply (for a maximum
consumption of 80.000 m3), while the previous infrastructure
guaranteed only 37.000 m3. However, much of the works lay
underground or far away from the urban center ; CFAL engineers
just couldn’t accept that such a grand improvement would not
be eye-witnessed by Lisbon inhabitants. The Ministry of Public
Works thus ordered a monumental fountain to celebrate the end
of water scarcity in Lisbon (33). The monument was placed
facing the impressive new buildings of the Superior Technical
Institute, the engineering institution breeding the technocrats of
the authoritarian New State, CFAL engineers included. The
Fountain and the Engineering School were built following the
architectural canons of the regime established by the Ministry of
Public Works, both standing as urban landmarks of the renewed
fascist capital.
The capital city of the Estado Novo (New State) dreamt by
minister-mayor Duarte Pacheco, was much bigger than the old
city limits. It included namely the planning of a prestigious tou-
rist area to the west connected to the city center by a scenic
highway offering quick access to its sand beaches. A copious
water supply was of course needed to sustain such expansion
and a new large conduit was built feeding the Sun Coast (as it
was named) with Lisbon water (Costa, 1941). In this case the
Company limited itself to supply the water, with the local muni-
cipalities along the coast being responsible for its distribution.
That was also the case of the conduit connecting the city center
with Sintra, another favorite tourist attraction currently listed as
MAP 2. WITH ALVIELA AND TEJO CHANEL (1943)
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a UNESCO world heritage site. Even if the first reason to secu-
re supply to such places located more than 20 km away from
Lisbon was to satisfy the growing tourism activity, the conduits
followed more or less the existing railway lines, thus providing
the infrastructure for the population living in those areas.
Actually, those two axes – along the coast to Cascais to the
West and up to Sintra to the Northwest – were to become two
of the main axes of development of the Lisbon metropolitan
area in the second half of the century. Another important expan-
sion followed the water conduits to the east, from where the
water was coming into Lisbon (34). The extension of water sup-
ply infrastructure by the Company to the Sun Coast, to Sintra
and along the canals that brought water into the city from the
East, was the first materialization of what would become the
Lisbon metropolitan area. Actually the Company and the CFAL
were the only entities that operated at the scale of the metropo-
lis in the 1940s and for many years thereafter. For the first time
it seemed that water was leading urban expansion and not the
other way round.
Yet the dramatic increase of population served by the com-
pany’s water meant an upsurge of the total consumption of 50%
between 1942 and 1947, with private consumption now taking
the lead (57% of the total) in contrast to the liberal and republi-
can periods. This meant that in 1949 Lisbon was facing shorta-
ge again, with water being rationed by the Company during
summer nights (35). This time the newspapers were not used as
a tribune for discussion of the infrastructure problems of the
capital, they were being used instead to publicize the restric-
tions to consumption, with the population, according to the
company’s account, willing to aid namely by promptly repor-
ting any leak (36). As already stated, all urban water conflicts
had been suppressed (37) even when water was lacking once
again and the summer rationing was back. News related to
water supply now had a distinguished positive tone when com-
pared with the repeated criticisms before the establishment of
the authoritarian rule (Schmidt, 2003).
In the following years, investments in distribution and the
introduction of new surface water through the Tejo Canal
(1963) would progressively improve records. Following the
unreliable official figures used by authorities for the big deve-
lopment plans of the next decades, the proportion of the popu-
lation supplied in Lisbon was finally reaching almost 100% at
the beginning of the 1970s (Comissão de Planeamento da
Região de Lisboa, 1973). What such numbers were hiding was
that much of the demographical expansion of the Lisbon area
during the 1960s, fed by a massive rural exodus, was being
absorbed by the uncontrolled proliferation of unplanned sub-
urbs and even slums where the water pipes of the company
didn’t arrive. Between 1960 and 1970, the population of the
metropolitan area grew roughly from 1.5 million to 1.8 million
inhabitants. In 1981, the total population for the area was alrea-
dy near 2.5 million (Ferrão, 1996; Schmidt, 2008). In twenty
years one million people settled in Lisbon; but the urban core
remained almost unchanged, with a little more than 800.000
inhabitants, while the poorly served peripheries boomed.
In the same years that the dictatorial regime was trying a shy
opening under the new leadership of Marcello Caetano (38),
showing namely more sensibility towards the social problems of
development, the newspapers began to inform about the drama
of Lisbon peripheries. In 1969, a 10 storey building collapsed in
the clandestine neighborhood of Brandoa, home of some
18,000 to 20,000 people, in what would become a symbol of
the chaotic expansion of Lisbon metropolis. Within such
unplanned suburbs and slums, even inside Lisbon, women and
children were regularly seen collecting water for their house-
holds and no sanitation infrastructures were available. In their
descriptions of the many ‘Brandoas’ around Lisbon, journalists
talked about barefoot children inhabiting the unplanned areas
of former farms that surrounded Lisbon where the lack of piped
water was denounced as the main nuisance (39). And the pro-
blem, once again, was also a shortage of the total volume of
water available for the water company to supply the unpredic-
WOMEN COLLECTING WATER AND SURROUNDED
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ted population growth (see Figure 2). In fact, water service inter-
ruptions were scarce at the urban core where distribution was
guaranteed by the Company. But they were more frequent in the
suburbs the underfinanced municipalities like Sintra or Cascais :
the Company just wasn’t able to face the demography boom
with a limited infrastructure of reservoirs and old tight pipes.
DEMOCRATIC WATERS (1974-2006)
The magnitude of the problem would become clear with the
return of cholera to Lisbon in 1971. The epidemics outbroke in
the slums, which sheltered some 150.000 people. The mass
vaccination of the slum dwellers and the campaigns of the heal-
th services stressing the importance of boiling water taken from
non treated sources, were enough to limit the death toll to 10
people among the few hundreds of choleric patients.
Nevertheless, repeating the gesture of the XIXth century hygie-
nists, doctors started to survey the sanitary conditions of the
new urbanites and denounced the lack of access to piped water
of the majority of the population outside the city core (40). With
few exceptions, the newcomers were relying mainly on isolated
wells and springs. The bacteriological analysis of such sources
revealed that 70% of their water was contaminated and non
potable.
The picture concerning sewage wasn’t much better, with
only one rudimentary plant for sewage treatment in the eastern
outskirts originally planned to receive the disposals of no more
than 50.000 people. If the main nuisance caused by this non
treated effluent was to pollute the beaches of the Sun Coast,
much worse was the proliferation of individual cesspits in the
new expansion areas faraway from central Lisbon contamina-
ting the very water sources people were using. It is important to
remind that the large majority of this population was formed by
first generation urbanites, bringing with them a rural culture of
water, where collective fountains were the main source of water
supply. Rather than expect, or even request the company to
bring its pipes to their homes, they just improvised their own
supply. In April 1974, the very month of the Carnation
Revolution that brought to an end 48 years of dictatorial rule, a
new cholera outbreak started to spread in southern Portugal rea-
ching Lisbon during the summer and killing thirteen out of six
hundred identified cholera cases (Figueiredo, 1974).
Water shortages together with cholera outbreaks in a revo-
lutionary context were too much for the old Water Company to
maintain its status (41). On June 21, 1974, company workers
occupied the facilities and, regardless of the contract that by
coincidence ended the concession that same year in October,
they demanded the firing of the board of directors. Three days
later the Government took the direct control of Lisbon water
supply with the members of the previous CFAL assuming the
leading role. In October the Empresa Pública de Águas de
Lisboa (EPAL) was formed, the first nationalized company of the
MAP 3. CASTELO DE BODE (1987)
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revolutionary period. Once again Lisbon waters were showing
the way for the future government intervention in the economy,
following not anymore the model of a corporative state like in
the 1930s, but putting the country on the path of socialism.
The following years the public company was generously
funded to put an end to the scandalous lack of water of the
Lisbon region (42). In addition to doubling the volume of surfa-
ce water taken from the river Tagus at Valada, a new system was
designed to bring water from the large reservoir of Castelo do
Bode in the Zêzere river, 100 km from Lisbon, which would be
inaugurated only in 1988.
The public company was finally able to deliver enough
water to the metropolitan area, although shortages were still
common in the peripheral municipalities responsible for the
distribution of the water supplied by EPAL. It was only in the
1990s and with EU funding, that a new main system was built
following the external ring road of Lisbon that allowed for the
water to be distributed to the different peripheries without pre-
viously circulating through central Lisbon reservoirs. Water sup-
ply infrastructure was finally losing its centralized character and
was matching the spatial expansion of the Lisbon metropolitan
area. But now, differently to what happened in the 1930s,
waters were following the urban sprawl and not the other way
round.
Since the 1970s, hydraulic works offering progressively
more and more water to the population had to be supplemen-
ted with environmental policies on sewage. The problem of
water pollution in Lisbon was magnified by the above mentio-
ned tourist nature of the coast west of the city ; newspapers in
the 1980s repeatedly denounced the bad water quality of the
beaches. The fast expansion of the western suburbs, with Sintra
becoming in the next decade the first urban agglomeration of
the country leaving Lisbon behind (43), meant a massive increa-
se in the wastewaters arriving to the beaches with no treatment.
The construction of a large sewage collector along the coast
was a complicated project that started in the 1970s and only
ended in the late 1990s. Once again, EU funds provided
enough financial resources to build the infrastructure respon-
sible for the present day blue flags – the European symbol of
good bathing water quality – along the Sun Coast beaches.
Nevertheless, newspapers are still reporting the overspill of the
interceptor under heavy rain conditions (combined sewer).
Also, many houses were still not connected to the drainage sys-
tem, so they kept throwing their sewage directly into the rivers
flowing into the sea (Schmidt, 2007). The construction of the big
collector destined to receive wastewater from all the new hou-
seholds started in the 1990’s, bringing some order to the chao-
tic urban expansion.
The EU was fundamental to improve bathing water quality ;
the urban waste water directive now requests discharges to
meet stricter quality levels ; according to SANEST, the company
responsible for sewerage along the Sun Coast, they are not met
by waste waters thrown into the sea. Required investments in
secondary treatment brought an increase in the operational
costs. The example of SANEST, together with SIMTEJO, the
company managing Lisbon wastewater, that only achieved their
objectives in 2011 (nearly full coverage of the population with
wastewater treatment), confirms in the Portuguese context the
difficulties that result from the overlapping of the lack of infra-
structure and environmental problems of late modernity.
The polemics around Castelo do Bode reservoir’s water qua-
lity, where EPAL takes most of its water to supply 2.6 million
people of the Lisbon region, illustrate these difficulties. If water
quality is guaranteed by the treatment station of Asseisseira one
must still point to the negative effects of construction on the
reservoir shores, with water quality indexes deteriorating (44).
In spite of the major significance of this water reservoir for the
future of the metropolitan area, the public discussion that took
place in 2003 on the development plan for the dam area didn’t
include representatives from the Lisbon area, as if the 100 km
distance meant a real geographical independence between
both areas: out of sight, out of mind. Even so since then, the
plan achieved a set of significant rules that improved protection
of water sources. After the difficult step of adding the sanitary
approach to the hydraulic one, water experts now have to start
considering territorial approaches where sustainable environ-
mental practices play a major role. Together with hydraulic and
sanitary engineers, the complexity of urban waters requests
companies to start hiring environmental experts and landscape
architects.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
With no surprise, much of the Lisbon water story has been an
important part of the Lisbon story for the last 150 years. The
urban expansion of the XIXth century; the fascist design of a
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and the difficult ‘Europeanization’ of Lisbon in the last decades
of the XXth century, can only be understood by including water
into the narrative. We saw how engineers repeatedly promised
to bring to an end water scarcity and epidemics resulting from
poor sanitation, and how the built water infrastructure was once
and again overstepped by urban dynamics. May be the best
example is provided by the fascist regime’s technocratic solu-
tion to Lisbon water supply at the beginning of the 1930s that
helped legitimate the New State, and its following inability to
expand infrastructure in the 1960s when all popular protest was
suppressed. But it is also significant that the revolutionary solu-
tion for the cholera epidemics of 1974 was to be found once
again by the government engineers responsible for the inspec-
tion of Lisbon waters. The EU funds of the 1980s didn’t bring
with them alternatives to this technocratic water culture with
Lisbon urbanites relying on EPAL (public company) for cheap
and abundant water, without caring too much about what is
going on in the faraway places where their water is captured.
Water is still much a business for experts, not for politics.
Taking together the detailed history of the Lisbon water case
and the bird’s eye view of sanitary infrastructure evolution in
Portugal along the XXth century, we can attempt a prospective
exercise on water future and its potential problems: institutions;
prices and privatization; uses; scarcity and climate change. Of
course the four types of conflicts are deeply interrelated but we
shall isolate them for analytical purposes and for the sake of the
argument.
The institutional problem may be the most obvious. If
Portugal does not comply with European quantity and quality
standards in water services, the European Commission will pro-
bably heavily fine detected faults. The EU does have a strict
water policy and the fact that it has been substantially funding
Portuguese water services for the last thirteen years offers it a
very strong political and moral argument. This was a current
problem: the EU penalized SANEST (see above) for having
discharged until 2000 wastewater only with primary treatment
into the Atlantic Ocean. Another institutional problem is the
one opposing the State holding Águas de Portugal and munici-
palities. The former is becoming less flexible with the fast gro-
wing debts of the latter, which keep demanding a ‘political
price’ for water instead of internalizing costs.
This last point leads us directly to the issue of prices. From
the above chapters we may easily conclude that the water cul-
ture in Portugal passed directly from individual self-sufficiency,
with people themselves digging wells and improvising cesspits,
to a total reliance on State ability to deliver cheap and abundant
water as well as free wastewater treatment. The ‘deterritoriali-
zation’ of water issues, with people ignoring the complex and
expensive infrastructure bringing water to their taps and taking
it back to sewage works, leads to stronger resistance by consu-
mers to abandon the present political price of water. In relation
to the previous point, as the EU requests stricter standards for
the Portuguese supply and sanitation infrastructure, prices will
have to rise to fund the growing operational costs. In many
municipalities the prices are already rising. Also, the envisaged
privatization of water services, which is already happening in
some localities, can bring significant price rises, as happened in
other countries, promoting the transition from latent forms of
conflicts to explicit ones. Private or not, the times of cheap
water are coming to an end, and consumers organized through
local associations and supported by municipalities, are starting
to show resistance.
Water has an aesthetical value that goes much beyond its
drinkable nature. In a previous work we identified the emer-
gence of an environmental paradigm with landscape planning
assuming a major role. Here, we are not only dealing with
potable water consumers, but also with citizens that consider
rivers’ good health defined in terms of pleasant landscapes as
part of their living quality standards.
Lastly, problems can emerge where water scarcity and com-
petitive uses occur, especially in the areas of the country where
the resource is not abundant. The predictions of climate chan-
ge effects for much of the country, but especially for its southern
regions, further stress the relevance of scarcity problems in the
near future: most reliable climate scenarios for the XXIst centu-
ry presented by the various models developed by the SIAM
research project indicate a “small increase of annual precipita-
tion for the northern region of Portugal and a decrease for the
central and southern regions”. These models “also estimate an
increase of the precipitation seasonal asymmetry, with relevant
decreases in summer precipitation” and with a subsequent
“progressive reduction in the annual river runoff and aquifer
recharge” (Santos and Miranda, 2006). It is fundamental to bear
in mind that the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change-
IPCC 2013 report recently identified that Portugal was one of
the most vulnerable countries of the Mediterranean basin to
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But if the new geographical distribution of water resources
may become the main source of trouble around water in the fol-
lowing years, the stories in this article suggest that it is not
enough to mobilize engineers and financial funds for solving
future problems. Although technology and money are central to
any possible solution, democratic societies should equally be
committed to develop mechanisms for the sustainable gover-
nance of water. This text explored how the different political
regimes of Portuguese modern history sustained different rela-
tions with water. Better said, water defined in important ways
what those regimes were about : liberalism and private compa-
nies with close relation to the state pushing to convert Lisbon
dwellers into consumers; republicanism and the emergence in
the public space of mass protest and biomedical power; fascism
and the juxtaposition of private capital and state authoritaria-
nism; democracy and universal access to infrastructure entan-
gled with EU bureaucracy. Water is much more than H2O, it is
a thing challenging political imagination.
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NOTES
(1) This is mostly based on Pato, 2008.
(2) The law published on the 6th of March 1884 approved
the Organization Plan for the Hydraulic Services, an adminis-
trative branch of the Ministry of Public Works that lasted until
1987. The revision of the legislation that defined the frontier
between public and private waters was launched eight years
later (Decree nº 8, December 1st 1892: Organization of the
Hydraulic Services and Respective Staff).
(3) For a comprehensive perspective on this argument see:
Pato and Serra, 2013, pp. 159-187.
(4) Actually, statistics were not regularly updated, no dis-
tinction was made between rural and urban services and the
evaluation procedures lacked methodological consistency.
Even today, distinct governmental bureaus produce different
numbers in respect to water services in Portugal. These num-
bers should then be seen as approximate indicators, not as
exact values.
(5) See the case of water supply to the city of Porto: a
concession to Compagnie Générale des Eaux pour l’Étranger
was signed in 1887, but deficiencies in systems operations were
sufficient motives for the municipality to cancel the contract
and install municipalized services (Cordeiro, 1993).
(6) There is a long discussion among historians on the pro-
per classification of the Portuguese New State that came out of
the 1926 coup d’état with ‘conservative authoritarianism’ being
the most consensual typology. Nevertheless, it is hard to miss
the fascist nature of many of the State institutions supporting the
thesis of Manuel Lucena that there is no other country like
Portugal that took so far the institutionalization of fascism,
making Oliveira Salazar’s New State “a fascism without fascist
movement”. See: Lucena, 1976; Pinto, 1992; Rosas, 1992.
(7) Data collected from the annual reports of the Bureau of
Urbanization Services (1944-1960).
(8) International comparisons between the structure of the
Portuguese budget and other Western European countries
reveal the low percentage of resources allocated to welfare poli-
cies by the Portuguese State prior to the Revolution. See: Lopes,
2005, pp. 265-304.
(9) Resolução do Conselho de Ministros de 23 de Janeiro de
1976.
(10) On the different water paradigms see: Barraqué et alii
(2012).
(11) Created in 1993, the company would only start opera-
ting effectively in 1995.
(12) In 1995, the Observatory for Multimunicipal Systems
was created as a first regulatory body, and it would be replaced
in 1997 by the IRAR (Instituto Regulador de Águas e Resíduos).
Later on, in 2009, IRAR was replaced by ERSAR (Entidade
Reguladora dos Serviços de Águas e Resíduos), that still ope-
rates today.
(13) Before the reform, the second city of the country,
Porto, experienced water shortage in the summer. This was
solved with the creation of a drinking water plant common to
several neighboring communes around Porto and Vilanova de
Gaia.
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ne) URL: www.ersar.pt (consulted on January 6th 2015).
(15) The upper level systems are considered a natural mono-
poly with no participation of private companies, and no private
sector investments are allowed. On the lower systems conces-
sions are distributed as follows: the public company Aquapor-
Luságua (owned by Águas de Portugal) is the most important,
with 13 participations on the market ; the biggest private com-
pany is controlled by the Somague Ambiente holding (an inter-
national private group), with 10 concessions; Indáqua (a
Portuguese private company) participates in 3 concessions, and
Compagnie Générale des Eaux Portugal represents the interests
of this group in 4 concessions.
(16) Distribution of the services by type: municipal compa-
nies – 11; municipal services – 223; municipalized services –
32 (see: RASARP 2004 report for these data).
(17) In March 2001, Margot Wallstrom, the European
Environmental Commissioner, considered the Portuguese waste
water services condition to be unacceptable after the enormous
amount of money invested with the contribution of EU funds.
For example, half of the 115 waste water treatment plants of the
Tagus basin were not respecting the minimum standards set for
their operation. For data on waste water treatment see :
Ministério do Ambiente, 1999.
(18) The national mean price is 0,98€/m3, but values vary
from the highest (2,38€/m3) to the lowest (0,15€/m3) (see:
RASARP 2012 report).
(19) One of the most relevant policy’ recommendation by
the regulator in 2009 is the full cost recovery of water munici-
pal services through water price.
(20) On the history of the XVIIIth century aqueduct see:
Moita, 1990; Caseiro et alii, 1999; Berger, 1994; Caetano,
1994.
(21) For a detailed description of the water sources inside
the city perimeter in the middle of the nineteenth century, see:
Andrade, 1851.
(22) On the tight relation between water infrastructure and
epidemics in the XIXth century see: Saraiva, 2005; Silva, 2006.
On epidemics and the evolution of Lisbon population see:
Rodrigues, 1995.
(23) On this issue see Saraiva, 2005, pp. 124-134.
(24) “O Contador de pressao do Sr. Antonio Pinto Bastos”,
O Occidente, IX, n. 276, 21/12/1888, pp. 191-192.
(25) On the mass event and its relation to the renewal of the
image’s capital see: Saraiva, 2005, pp. 137-142.
(26) “A falta d’agua em Lisboa”, Ilustração Portuguesa
(7/7/1913)
(27) “Um pavoroso incêndio”, Ilustração Portuguesa
(1/10/1917)
(28) “A água que Lisboa bebe”, O Século (16/3/1940)
(29) A big progress when compared to the 35 cases per
100.000 inhabitants for the years 1916-1920.
(30) Duarte Pacheco (1900-1943) was the Ministry of Public
Works of the authoritarian regime led by Oliveira Salazar from
1932 to 1936 and from 1938 to 1943, the year of his death. He
was also the mayor of Lisbon from 1938 to 1943. Duarte
Pacheco, an engineer by training, represents the technocratic
character of the regime, a soft version of Albert Speer, launching
a vast program of public works to change Portugal’s image, and
in particular to convert Lisbon into the metropolis of the new
empire. He died in 1943 in a car accident that symbolized in a
tragic way the modernism of the most dynamic leader of the
Portuguese New State.
(31) During the authoritarian regime of the Estado Novo,
the municipal powers were directly nominated by the central
government. It is hard to distinguish what is local and what is
central especially in the case of Lisbon, when the ministry of
Public Works Duarte Pacheco was nominated Lisbon mayor in
1938.
(32) For a media coverage overview, see: Schmidt et alii,
2012.
(33) On the evolution of Lisbon under the authoritarian
New State, see: Ferreira, 1986; Acciaiuoli, 1998.
(34) It may be argued that we thus leave aside all the sou-
thern urban expansion across the river where the company
pipes never arrived. One of the main features responsible for the
very disperse southern settlement pattern is the lack of infra-
structure (see: Portas et alii, 2004), namely water supply, with
the population relying till the 1980’s mainly on private wells
(River Basin Plan). The lack of an extended sewage system made
things worse with the aquifers used by the population being
polluted by the increasing population density.
(35) “Nota referente às restrições de abastecimento de água
em Lisboa, no Verão de 1949”, Boletim da Comissão de
Fiscalização das Águas de Lisboa, 30, pp. 81-84.
(36) Also, and in spite of the extension of the distribution
network inside the city limits, 33% of Lisbon households were
still not connected by 1943. The numbers gathered by CFAL’s
initiative also revealed, as expected, that the main proportion of
unconnected people was formed by the poorer social segments.
See: Schmidt et alii, 2012.
(37) The only exceptions were the conflicts between the
company and the landowners of estates where new sources for
the city supply were being established. There were also com-
plaints that reached the national Assembly on the excessive zeal
put on isolating the water conduits and the sources from their
surroundings as denounced by farmers and shepherds.
(38) Marcello Caetano (1906-1980) assumed the control of
the authoritarian regime in 1968 softening its repressive charac-
ter in what has become known in the historiography as the
Marcelist Spring. Nevertheless, his strategy of ‘keep the course’
in the colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné Bissau
eventually led to his overthrown by the 1974 revolution.
(39) “O cerco à cidade – Brandoas há muitas”, O Século
Ilustrado (31/10/1970)
(40) “A Cólera em Portugal – Entrevista com o Dr. Arnaldo
Sampaio”, O Médico, LXI n.1056, 1971, pp. 605-609.
(41) The contract by coincidence ended the concession that
same year in October (Empresa Pública de Águas de Lisboa,
1975).
(42) See the Annual reports of EPAL, 1974-1980.
(43) For numbers on Lisbon urban growth go to URL:
www.ecoline.ics.ul.pt (consulted on January 6th 2015)
(44) The water indexes deteriorated from A1 to A3. See:
Vieira, 2003.
(45) See the IPCC website URL : http://www.ipcc.ch/
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